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La calificación crediticia de Estados Unidos ayuda a justificar el Bitcoin
La rebaja de la calificación de la deuda estadounidense por parte de Fitch esta semana es una advertencia para los responsables políticos estadounidenses y subraya por qué Bitcoin y otros sistemas monetarios abiertos son importantes, afirma Michael Casey.

Cada vez que la calificación crediticia de Estados Unidos entra en escena, como sucedió conLa sorpresiva rebaja de la calificación de Fitch Esta semana, es una oportunidad para discutir la conexión entre el dinero, la deuda y el poder y explorar cómo Bitcoin y las Cripto podrían cambiar esas relaciones.
Para empezar, cabe señalar que, si bien una rebaja de la calificación crediticia refleja una perspectiva moderadamente peor para las finanzas del gobierno estadounidense, es muy improbable que este incurra en un impago real, a pesar del juego de la gallina de los huevos de oro del Congreso, que periódicamente da pie a hablar de un "impago técnico". Los países que emiten deuda en su propia moneda rara vez incumplen los pagos nominales, porque no tienen necesidad de hacerlo. Simplemente pueden imprimir dinero para realizar los pagos.
Estás leyendoEl dinero reinventadoUn análisis semanal de los Eventos y tendencias tecnológicos, económicos y sociales que están redefiniendo nuestra relación con el dinero y transformando el sistema financiero global. Suscríbase para recibir el boletín completo. aquí.
Por supuesto, imprimir dinero para pagar deudas no exime a los gobiernos de responsabilidad. Hacerlo deprecia el tipo de cambio y reduce el poder adquisitivo de la moneda a través de la inflación, imponiendo así una especie de impuesto tanto a la población nacional como a los acreedores extranjeros. Esto socava la confianza de los inversores extranjeros y alimenta la desconfianza de los contribuyentes, creando un ciclo que se perpetúa de caídas de los tipos de cambio y precios más altos.
En teoría, estos resultados económicos adversos deberían incentivar a los gobiernos a no aplicar Regulación monetarias expansivas para afrontar sus deudas. Sin embargo, esto presupone la existencia de rendición de cuentas democrática, y los Mercados internacionales de deuda sugieren que los acreedores juzgan a los distintos gobiernos de forma diferente en ese aspecto. Muchos gobiernos de mercados emergentes en América Latina, Asia, África y Europa del Este no pueden emitir deuda en sus propias monedas porque las instituciones crediticias extranjeras exigen tasas de interés superiores a las asequibles, lo que les obliga a emitir bonos en moneda extranjera, principalmente en dólares.
In fact, because international sovereign credit markets largely trade in debt denominated in dollars, it’s the U.S. – the very same country that Fitch just declared to be a less-than-perfect credit risk – that most gets to shape those assessments, creating distortions in what should be a free market. It’s another way the dollar’s reserve status affords the U.S.’s “exorbitant privilege,” in this case the power to influence geopolitical outcomes and push for the profit-interests of its banks.
The U.S. wields this power, in part, through the International Monetary Fund, within which, as the largest shareholder, it is the only country with sole veto power.
When the IMF swoops in with a bailout offer because Argentina or Turkey or Nigeria is staring down the barrel at debt defaults, it attaches constraints on the deal – fiscal austerity, macroeconomic reforms, higher interest rates and so forth – all in the name of restoring the confidence of foreign creditors. These politically unpopular policies are largely dictated by what the U.S. wishes, and often they can be dialed up or down in intensity to put pressure on a political enemy or support a friend.
Banks, meanwhile, with the help of perhaps the most powerful lobbying entity you’ve never heard of – the DC-based International Institute of Finance, or IIF – regularly emerge out of negotiations with their assets more or less intact. It’s a giant, international version of the “corporate socialism” that was observed in the U.S. following the massive bank bailouts during the mortgage crisis of 2008.
Enter Bitcoin
When, as a journalist in Argentina, I covered that country’s decade-long, torturous debt restructuring in the 2000s, I found myself sympathetic to the domestic left’s critique of the U.S.-led IMF’s excessive power. But I also had little faith in the corrupt and dysfunctional Argentine political system, which led me to begrudgingly view the IMF as a necessary disciplinarian. I found Argentine government protestations that Washington was stripping the country of its economic sovereignty to be self-serving, as it was really about protecting a corrupt political class.
Then, four years later, I got interested in Bitcoin and began to look back on that period quite differently. I saw a third, middle way.
The core issue that should have been at stake in Argentina’s debt negotiations was not the independence or sovereignty of the government per se, but of the Argentine people. And when it came to their monetary system, Argentines’ sovereignty had been stripped away by politicians who’d debased their wealth and restricted their access to their bank accounts.
Thanks to Bitcoin, the citizens of developing economies can now opt out of this undemocratic and distorted international system in which they are caught between their own corrupt, domestic government models and a Washington-Wall Street nexus of self-serving power.
That citizen element is what made El Salvador’s move to declare bitcoin legal tender interesting, far more so than the fact that the government also chose to build a stash of the digital currency, which President Nayeb Bukele and his supporters often described as an act of asserting the nation’s sovereignty in breaking its dependence on dollar reserves. I tend to think Bukele’s purchases recklessly exposed the country’s finances to intense volatility and investor mistrust. But the idea of explicitly granting freedom for people to choose bitcoin if they desired was a powerful, symbolic act of affirming citizens’ agency and sovereignty.
El Salvador is not the only country claiming to restore monetary sovereignty. China and its allies are exploring ways to reduce their dependence on the dollar. They believe central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) can help them achieve that. Some are already working on digital swap models that provide workarounds to bypass the dollar in trade.
When combined with fiscal challenges in Washington, this process could move faster than we think, as the loss of confidence in dollar assets combines with an expansion of a parallel, Chinese-led system.
What should the U.S. do about it? It could exercise fiscal discipline, abandoning counterproductive debt ceiling standoffs for bipartisan efforts to sensibly reprioritize spending and taxation. But that currently sounds like an impossible utopia.
What it should do is lean into the principle of free choice and open systems in money. Giving people that choice would be consistent with its values, which are, in any case, the “soft power” pieces of what makes the dollar the preferred currency of the world.
There’s an implicit bargain in the world’s demand for dollars: it suggests people the world over expect the U.S. government to uphold its values with regards to human rights and property rights. They expect that it will not confiscate someone’s property, even if they are a foreigner without a vote, such as a bondholder (unless you’re a Russian oligarch, Iranian ruler or someone else on the sanctions list). And they expect the country’s democratic foundations are strong enough that a U.S. dictator won’t arise who would choose to debase the currency in favor of his own interests.
So, the counterintuitive way to boost the dollar’s standing and stave the threat posed by a deteriorating credit profile and challenges from China and co. is to let people choose how they want to transact. The U.S. should actively encourage the right to open monetary systems, whether that’s bitcoin or stablecoins, both of which will be shaped by the fate of two pieces of key crypto legislation currently in the House – which, it is feared, the Democrat-controlled Senate or White House will reject.
There’s much at stake in all this.
Nota: Las opiniones expresadas en esta columna son las del autor y no necesariamente reflejan las de CoinDesk, Inc. o sus propietarios y afiliados.
Michael J. Casey
Michael J. Casey es presidente de The Decentralized AI Society, exdirector de contenido de CoinDesk y coautor de "Nuestra mayor lucha: Reclamando la libertad, la humanidad y la dignidad en la era digital". Anteriormente, Casey fue director ejecutivo de Streambed Media, empresa que cofundó para desarrollar datos de procedencia para contenido digital. También fue asesor sénior de la Iniciativa de Moneda Digital de MIT Media Labs y profesor titular de la Escuela de Administración Sloan del MIT. Antes de incorporarse al MIT, Casey trabajó 18 años en The Wall Street Journal, donde su último puesto fue como columnista sénior sobre asuntos económicos globales. Casey es autor de cinco libros, entre ellos "La era de las Criptomonedas: cómo Bitcoin y el dinero digital están desafiando el orden económico global" y "La máquina de la verdad: la cadena de bloques y el futuro de todo", ambos en coautoría con Paul Vigna. Tras incorporarse a CoinDesk a tiempo completo, Casey renunció a diversos puestos de asesoría remunerada. Mantiene puestos no remunerados como asesor de organizaciones sin fines de lucro, como la Iniciativa de Moneda Digital del MIT Media Lab y The Deep Trust Alliance. Es accionista y presidente no ejecutivo de Streambed Media. Casey posee Bitcoin.
